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Constitutional theorizing is a tricky business.  The document is ancient, was often written 
to fix discrete problems that have little modern salience, and frequently contains vague and 
capacious language, the plausible extension of which defies straightforward theoretical exegesis. 
On occasion, as with the Fourth Amendment, all three symptoms may be present, making 
theorizing a largely futile endeavor.1  The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
suffers from at least two of these three problems.  It is certainly ancient and was written to 
eliminate specific abuses of authority that have no close modern analogues;2 indeed, the most 
unproblematic application of the right against self-incrimination today is to custodial 
interrogation by the police, a practice that did not even exist when the Fifth Amendment was 
ratified.3  Even though the language of the Fifth Amendment (which henceforth we use 
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 Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 
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2interchangeably with “Self-Incrimination Clause”) is more constraining than that of the Fourth, 
given the total reformation of the practical significance of the Fifth Amendment, perhaps it is not 
surprising that the theoretical foundations of the Fifth Amendment are thought to be in disarray, 
a belief fed in part by inadequacies of the Supreme Court’s efforts to articulate its foundations.  
The Supreme Court’s opinions contain stirring rhetoric that may move the heart but leave the 
intellect unconvinced.  In the most famous articulation of the theoretical foundations of the fifth 
amendment, the Court said :
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our 
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements 
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which 
dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the 
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the 
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our 
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of 
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while 
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. 4
The various points in the quoted passage are striking in their vacuity and circularity.  To 
take but a few examples: an innocent person faces no trilemma; there is no simply dichotomy 
between accusatorial and inquisitorial regimes; never has the government had to “shoulder the 
entire load”; far from “human personality” being “inviolable,” law molds and shapes “human 
personality” directly, constantly and unavoidably; immunity permits the most private aspects of a 
person’s life to be divulged, as occurs in civil cases daily across the land. These points are not 
new. 5  Even Justice Goldberg, the author of the paragraph, observed that the Self-Incrimination 
4
 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (internal quotations omitted), quoted in Arenella, supra 
note xx, at 36-37 (1982).
5 Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COL. L. 
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3Clause is “regarded as so fundamental a part of our constitutional fabric, despite the fact that ‘the 
law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or just 
whom it is intended to protect.’”6
This conceptual ambiguity has not escaped the scholars and has led to a proliferation of 
scholarly emendations to the Court’s explanations, which uniformly fail to convince.7  Amar and 
Lettow wrote, “[t]he Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of 
vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights.”8  William Stuntz summed it 
up: “It is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the 
privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”9
But there is an ambiguity in the word “theory” threaded through the various judicial and 
scholarly treatments of the Fifth Amendment.  It sometimes is used to refer to the justification of 
a practice, which is the sense in which Justice Goldberg was theorizing.  At other times it is used 
to predict or prescribe the scope or limitations of governmental power on the one hand, or 
privacy, autonomy, or dignity interests of citizens on the other.  Some of the theoretical 
difficulties infecting the Fifth Amendment may result from failing to sort out these different 
perspectives.  To be sure, one reasonably may think that the theoretical justification for a practice 
must constrain its scope.  Interestingly, the Fifth Amendment offers a counter-example to such a 
supra note xx).  See also Alschuler, supra note xx, at 200 (1997) (“More than the adaptation of old doctrines to new 
functions, the history of the privilege against self-incrimination seem to reveal the tyranny of slogans.  Shorthand 
phrases have taken on lives of their own.  These phrases have eclipsed the goals of the doctrines that they purported 
to describe and even the texts that embodied these doctrines.”).
6 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56 n.5 (quoting Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment—Some Legal and Impractical 
Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC SCI. 181, 182 (1953)), quoted in Michael Edmund O’Neill, The Fifth Amendment 
in Congress: Revisiting the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L. J. 2445, 2445-46 (2002).
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4belief, which is the main burden of this article.  While its justification is, we agree, hopelessly 
muddled, the scope of the Fifth Amendment (its implications in the real world for 
government/citizen interactions) can be specified quite clearly.  While, in other words, there is 
no general theoretical justification for the Fifth Amendment, there is a powerfully explanatory 
positive theory.  Moreover, we can specify equally precisely where there remains ambiguity, and 
the possible directions that future developments might take—indeed, must take, given what the 
Court has done to date.  Which path the Court may choose is unclear, but the paths that will be 
open are apparent.  In this respect, the Court’s treatment of the self-incrimination clause mirrors
its treatment of the fourth amendment.10  Both defy general justificatory theories, yet both lead to 
relatively predictable results.  This, in turn, may have implications for the nature and utility of 
some forms of legal scholarship, a point we return to at the conclusion of this article.
Although discussion of abstract values can still be found occasionally in its opinions,11
the Supreme Court has shifted to a formal approach to the Fifth Amendment.12 The Self-
Incrimination Clause states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”13  Under what Lance Cole described as “Fisher’s new textualist 
analytical approach,”14 the Court has concluded that Fifth Amendment violations must contain 
10 See Allen & Rosenberg ***.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690-98 (1998) (analyzing the “catalog of ‘Policies of the 
Privilege’ in Murphy, 378 U.S. 52).
12
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Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393 (1995); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1986); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at 
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); and Amar & Lettow, supra note xx.
13 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
14
 Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents After United States v. 
Hubbell – New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 142-43 (2002) (explaining that in Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1976), the Court “rejected both property rights and personal privacy as 
rationales for protection against self-incrimination; instead, it looked to the text of the Fifth Amendment and focused 
on the compulsion of ‘testimonial’ communications as the touchstone for self-incrimination analysis.”).
5three elements: compulsion, incrimination, and testimony.15 Testimony, however, has never 
been clearly defined and is the source of the remaining unpredictability in the future of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Although never acknowledged by the Court, its cases make plain that “testimony” 
is the substantive content of cognition—the propositions with truth-value that people hold or 
generate (as distinct from the ability to hold or generate propositions with truth-value).  
This observation leads to a comprehensive positive theory of the Fifth Amendment right: 
the government may not compel disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of cognition 
that themselves (the substantive results) are the product of state action  As we demonstrate in this 
article, this theory explains all of the cases, a feat not accomplished under any other scholarly or 
judicial theory.  Indeed, its fit with the cases is remarkable.  As we develop below, it even 
explains the most obvious datum that might be advanced against it—the sixth birthday question 
in Muniz. 16
As we also elaborate below, there remain two sources of ambiguity in Fifth Amendment 
adjudications.  First, compulsion and incrimination are both continuous variables—questions of 
degree.  The Court has recognized this, and set about defining the amount of compulsion and 
incrimination essential to a Fifth Amendment violation.  The result is a common law of both 
topics rather than a precise metric of either, but still the lay of the land is relatively clear.  
Thankfully, since these two variables are independent and do not interact, computational 
complexities do not creep in. “Compulsion,” in other words, is not determined in part by the 
15
 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the 
accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
16
 See infra pp. xx-xx for a discussion of Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990), where the Court 
considered whether the Fifth Amendment was implicated by the question, posed to a suspect by police officers, “Do 
you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?”
6extent to which the results are “incriminating.” Compulsion is determined on its own, as is the 
sufficiency of incrimination.
The second source of ambiguity arises because the Court has not explicitly equated 
“testimony” with cognition (again, thoughts in the form of propositions with truth-value).  As we 
show, though, that is precisely what has controlled the Court’s decisions.  Given that the Court’s 
opinions have not focused on substantive cognition as the third element of a Fifth Amendment 
violation, it is not surprising that the Court has not clarified whether cognition, too, is a 
continuous or discontinuous variable.  This is where the future lies.  The Court will have to 
clarify two matters: first, whether the extent of cognition matters, and second, the derivative 
consequences of cognition.  In addition, the Court will have to determine whether these two 
issues are, like compulsion and incrimination, independent or dependent.  Does the extensiveness 
of the compelled cognition determine how far its causal effect will be traced?
Part I elaborates our positive theory of the Fifth Amendment through an examination of 
the three variables that constitute it.  Of course a positive theory is not normative or justificatory, 
and to be clear, although we return to this point at the end of the article, we largely leave such 
inquiry to others (largely because we think it a futile and misguided waste of resources that 
misconceives the very phenomena supposedly being theorized17).  In Part II, we elaborate on the 
ambiguity introduced into Fifth Amendment adjudications by the Court’s recent decision in 
United States v. Hubbell.18  We show that in Hubbell the Court veered sharply from the apparent 
course set by Fisher v. United States,19 by recognizing a dramatically different role for cognition 
and its consequences.  In Fisher, though compelled cognition itself was protected, law 
enforcement had ready access to the incriminating information derived from it.  In Hubbell, by 
17
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 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
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7inflating derivative use immunity to previously unseen proportions, the Court expanded the 
scope of protection.  After Hubbell, there are three possibilities for the future of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, which Part III explores:  1) the Court will view Hubbell as a mere 
bump in the road past which the Fisher line of cases will continue, ultimately ignoring the new 
approach with which Hubbell flirted; 2) Hubbell will be followed to its natural end in an 
expansive derivative use doctrine triggered by any compelled cognition; or 3) the most likely 
possibility is that the Court will develop in a common-law manner the concept of “extensive” use 
of a suspect’s cognition, referred to in Hubbell, and begin to identify some threshold for 
“extensive” cognition that separates Hubbell and Fisher, in addition to constraining derivative 
use.
I. Compulsion, Incrimination, and Cognition
Law enforcement officers ask John Doe to consent to a lie detector test but 
Doe refuses, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  The 
officers try to physically restrain him, but he resists.  Eventually, they strap Doe 
to a gurney and attach a polygraph machine.  The tester begins to ask questions.  
He first asks Doe easy questions like his name, age, and address.  The officers 
already have this information but they want to establish his baseline, normal 
response.  Doe refuses to answer even these simple questions and sits silently.  
Though the tester is not able to elicit any oral responses, he records Doe’s 
physiological responses to the questions.  
After working through his script of introductory questions, the tester 
moves on to questions about Doe’s participation in a crime.  Doe remains silent, 
but the tester continues to record the changes in his heart rate, blood pressure, 
breathing, and electrodermal responses (electrical conductance at the skin 
level).20  The questions become more and more specific but Doe never speaks; in 
fact, he does his best not to communicate anything at all to the tester.  
At one point, the tester asks about the victim of the crime they are 
investigating.  The officers know that a little girl was abducted from a YMCA in 
Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve.  An eyewitness described someone who 
20
 These are some of the physiological responses currently analyzed in polygraph tests.  See BOARD ON 
BEHAVIORAL, COGNITIVE, AND SENSORY SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS, THE 
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 12-13 (2003) (available at 
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/12.html#pagetop).
8looked like Doe and the officers arrested him pursuant to a warrant.  Now they 
urgently want to find the little girl.  The officers have provided the tester with 
maps of a twenty-mile area around the YMCA.  The tester divides the map with a 
grid and tries to elicit from Doe the location of the little girl.  Systematically, 
starting with large quadrants and narrowing to a smaller area, the tester points 
to each section of the map.  Still, Doe remains silent and the tester records his 
physiological responses.  By continuing this process, the tester is able to narrow 
in and find a very specific location that causes Doe to respond dramatically: his 
heart races and his breathing quickens.  The officers search this location and find 
the body of the little girl.
Later, the State admits the polygraph test results at Doe’s trial for 
abduction and murder.  In his testimony, the tester reads each question that he 
asked Doe and describes Doe’s physiological responses.  He shows the jury how 
he systematically pointed to each area of the map and describes how he was able 
to elicit from Doe enough information to lead the officers to the body.  The jury 
convicts.21
The implications of this hypothetical have bedeviled analysis of the Fifth Amendment.  
There is perhaps universal agreement that the actions of the officers violate the Fifth 
Amendment, but why?  There is certainly compulsion and incrimination, but where is the 
testimony?22 The lack of a clear answer feeds the sense that there is a conceptual hole at the 
middle of the Fifth Amendment. Testimony is a necessary ingredient; yet even though it is 
absent, the universal intuition is that strapping someone to a lie detector would violate the 
Constitution.23  The answer to this puzzle is that “testimony” means the substantive results of 
cognition.  It is the failure to recognize that “testimony” reduces to cognition that has left the 
Justices and the theorists unable to explain the hypothetical—and more importantly to construct 
a coherent explanation of the cases.  We discuss compulsion, incrimination, and testimony in 
21
 The facts in this hypothetical loosely resemble those in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).  There, 
however, the officers used a map and grid to conduct their own search of the area.  Mr. Williams told the police 
where to find the little girl’s body in response to what has become know as the “Christian burial speech.”  A 
polygraph test was not administered.
22
 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled 
production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a 
Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
23 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (“To compel a person to submit to testing in which an 
effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or 
not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”).
9turn, the first two somewhat more briefly as they present no real theoretical problems, and 
testimony as cognition more in detail, as that is the contribution and the lynchpin of our 
argument.  The section closes with a comprehensive theory of the privilege that explains all of 
the cases.
A. Compulsion
The test for compulsion under the Fifth Amendment is “whether, considering the totality 
of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”24  Most of the difficulty with 
determining compulsion is a direct consequence of the free will/determinism problem at the 
center of this definition.25  If free will does not exist, the most plausible position,26 then 
obviously the test is conceptually and functionally bankrupt.  If it does exist, then either all 
choices are exercises of free will (a person can always choose to endure more torture), leaving 
the test inconsequential if not bankrupt, or there is no method to distinguish whether a particular 
act is a result of free will or of free will being overborne.  How would we ever know, for 
instance, if a particular person being subjected to torture could have held out but confessed 
because of the rising tide of guilt washing over him?  And how would we know whether the 
mildest threat, like the risk of a short jail sentence, actually overbore the will of a weak-willed 
individual?
24
 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
25
 For a very basic explanation of the free will/determinism debate see SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 102-03, 147 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (1994).
26
 If an act is constrained by the reasons for the act, the act is not free.  If these reasons exist because of other 
reasons, an infinite regress ensues.  “Free will” would have to be composed of, or derived from, reasons held for no 
reason at all, which, while “free” in one sense eliminates rationality.  If “free will” means random or capricious 
starting points, it does not seem to be worthy of respect.  But, any alternative to randomness or capriciousness that 
preserves rationality rules out free will.
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Although some of the rhetoric of the Supreme Court, and that of some commentators, 
remain fascinated with, or stuck in, the free will/determinism debate,27 the results of the cases are 
explainable in other terms, indicating that the Fifth Amendment does not require an answer to the 
problem.  Free will, despite the assertions of some,28 is not a necessary predicate for criminal law 
generally, or for the right against compelled self-incrimination specifically.29  As in many areas 
of the law, the Court has employed an objective test that focuses on the governmental action 
rather than the individual response.  This converts the meaningless or intractable question of free 
will into a demarcation of how much pressure is too much to exceed the threshold for 
the“compulsion” necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation.30
The question remains, where is the demarcation—what sorts of governmental actions that 
result in disclosure of self-incriminating testimony are prohibited by the Constitution?  The 
answer emerges from the Court’s assessments of social conventions concerning threats and 
promises, assessments that are factually bound and developed in a traditional common-law 
manner.  One such convention is that physical force is inappropriate, and thus the case of John 
27 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (1991).
28 See id. at 243-44 (“The criminal law follows Plato and Aristotle by presupposing that members of society are 
autonomous actors who can be punished for choosing to act in certain ways.”) (citing R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO 
SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927) (“noting that criminal law historically “postulates a free agent confronted 
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong”); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *20-21 (“the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in 
question, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable.”)).
29
 Jeremy Bentham, for instance, was a determinist in addition to being very interested in jurisprudence and hopeful 
that a code of laws could be established that would make men conform to the public interest.  See BERTRAND 
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 775 (1945).  Determinism should not be confused with fatalism 
which may be more incongruous with a system of criminal law.  See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF PHILOSOPHY 137 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (1994) (Fatalism is “[t]he doctrine that human action has no 
influence on events. . . .  Fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implication that 
human action is ineffectual.”).
30 See Arenella, supra note xx at 39 (“Ultimately, what is at issue here is a normative question: the extent to which 
an individual can be forced to participate in his own self-condemnation.  Its resolution requires the Court to balance 
conflicting concerns of fairness to the accused against the state’s legitimate need to secure reliable information of 
wrongdoing.”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 866 
(1979) (arguing that “normative judgments about various degrees of impairment of mental freedom” are required),
cited in Thomas & Bilder, supra note xx, at 266 n.125.  To be clear, we take no position on whether what the Court 
has done is itself normatively desirable; rather, we are simply engaging in factual exegesis. 
11
Doe involves compulsion.31  If there is any “testimony” in Doe’s hypothetical case, it was 
obtained by physically restraining him and subjecting him to unwanted touching by a machine.
Through a standard common-law approach the Court has placed various kinds of 
compulsion along a continuum, producing a list of acceptable and unacceptable governmental 
actions.  Examples abound; indeed, they define the constitutional conception of compulsion for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.  A defendant may be made to allocute when entering a guilty 
plea.32  The government can place burdens on an individual’s out-of-court choice whether to 
invoke the privilege.33  There is no “impermissible coercion” where the defendant is not involved 
31 See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (“The longstanding common-law principle, nemo tenetur 
seipsum prodere, was thought to ban only testimony forced by compulsory oath or physical torture . . .”); South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (“[T]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited 
to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.”) (citing
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)).
32
 Though this has sometimes been described as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right, LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE §21.5(f) (3d ed. 2000), it is more accurate to recognize it as a simple absence of compulsion because a 
court may only accept guilty pleas that are “voluntary.”  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central 
to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court 
that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.  He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded 
by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so—hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the 
voluntary expression of his own choice.”).  A valid plea colloquy cannot violate the right against self-incrimination 
because the defendant has, by definition, freely chosen to plead guilty.  Federal courts enforce this through Rule 
11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which states, “courts shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary 
and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d) (2000).
33 See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (“respondent’s choice is marked less by compulsion than by 
choices the Court has held give no rise to a self-incrimination claim. The ‘criminal process, like the rest of the legal 
system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow.   
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, 
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.’  It is well settled that the government 
need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.”) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183, 213 (1971)).  See also Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (finding no violation 
where an adverse inference is drawn from an individual’s refusal to answer questions before a clemency board);
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (concluding that the state’s impeachment use of the defendant’s pre-arrest 
silence did not constitute an undue burden on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment rights); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357 (1978) (upholding the validity of imposing serious burdens on the defendant’s exercise of his privilege 
in the plea-bargaining context); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 947 (1976) (permitting adverse inference from the 
refusal to testify in a prison disciplinary hearing); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that application 
of the Florida notice-of-alibi rule did not compel the defendant to be a witness against himself); Amar & Lettow, 
supra note xx, at 868 (arguing that “outside the courtroom, the ‘no worse off’ test seems extravagant and 
unworkable:  the logical consequences are absurd.”).  But see Uniform Sanitation Men Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Sanitation of City of New York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (loss of employment as a penalty is capable of coercing 
incriminating testimony); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (holding that the loss of the right to 
12
in the production of information,34 or takes an action contrary to what the state wants him to 
do.35  Included here are cases where the individual lies,36 refuses to cooperate with a permissible 
test,37 or engages in “guilty conduct.”38  The government has clearly applied too much 
pressure—compulsion has occurred—where there has been physical or psychological torture,39
participate in political associations and to hold public office are penalties capable of coercing incriminating 
testimony).
34 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (“[I]n this case, petitioner was not asked to say or to do 
anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search 
for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records were 
introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner 
to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not 
present.”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (holding that where the petitioner had delivered 
business and tax records to her accountant, she was not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent 
production of the documents pursuant to a subpoena served on the accountant because her “divestment of 
possession” of the records had removed the “element of personal compulsion” necessary under the Fifth 
Amendment).
35 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560-62 (1983) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation where the 
state admitted at trial the defendant’s refusal to undergo a permissible blood-alcohol test because the response was 
not compelled).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (finding that it was not error to admit false exculpatory 
statements); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (holding that prosecution for making false statements on 
wagering registration forms was not barred, though defendant could have validly refused to complete the form by 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination).  It is possible to imagine a situation in which a suspect is 
compelled to lie by being forced to sign a confession he knows is not true.  This would satisfy the compulsion 
component of a Fifth Amendment violation.
37 See, e.g., Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (finding no violation of the privilege for lack of compulsion where the state 
admitted the defendant’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test that could be legitimately compelled by the state).  
Refusals to speak, or choosing to remain silent, cannot be presented as evidence of guilt.  This is not because the 
refusal has been compelled but because to comment on silence may make the assertion of the right too burdensome.  
See supra note xx and accompanying text.
38 When an individual engages in what might be described as “guilty conduct,” such as unprovoked flight from 
police or destruction of evidence, there is no compulsion and thus no violation of the privilege if evidence of such 
conduct is introduced at trial as circumstantial evidence of the individual’s consciousness of guilt.  Professor 
Arenella argued that use of “guilty conduct evidence” is not a violation of the Self-incrimination Clause, but 
emphasized that this was because the conduct was not “testimonial.”  Arenella, supra note xx, at 43.  We believe 
that “guilty conduct evidence,” is best analyzed under the compulsion component.  Though the Supreme Court has 
not squarely addressed this issue, it is firmly established that guilty conduct evidence may be presented and 
commented on at trial without violating a defendant’s right against self-incrimination.  See United States v. Carter, 
236 F.3d 777, 792 n.11 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the following 
instruction on flight: “You have received evidence that after the crime was supposed to have been committed, the 
Defendant, Roquel Allen Carter, fled.  If you believe from the evidence that the Defendant did indeed flee, then you 
may consider this conduct, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the Government has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.  This conduct may indicate that he thought he was 
guilty and was trying to avoid punishment.  On the other hand, sometimes an innocent person may flee to avoid 
being arrested, or for some other innocent reason.”).
39 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002) (“Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves 
a question of judgment:  Courts must decide whether the consequences of an inmate’s choice to remain silent are 
closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against which it 
does not.”); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“One of [the privilege’s] purposes is to prevent the state, 
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or where a defendant, upon a grant of immunity, has been ordered to testify in court under 
penalty of contempt.40
These determinations by courts of what constitutes impermissible coercion do little more 
than reflect our conventions about when an individual’s will is likely to be overborne.  Professor 
Peter Westen and Stewart Mandell recognized that compulsion is a continuous variable involving 
different kinds or levels of pressure in differing settings.41  Not only is there a common-law line 
demarking how much compulsion is necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation, but Westen and 
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under 
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”). 
See also Alschuler, supra note xx, at 192 (analyzing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of 
the adoption of the amendment and concluding, “the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incriminating 
interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future 
punishment and promises of leniency.”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (creating the presumption of 
compulsion in custodial interrogations after observing that “[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into 
police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above 
cannot be otherwise than under the compulsion to speak.”).
40 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (observing that the “classic Fifth Amendment violation” is 
“telling a defendant at trial to testify.”); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (“Testimony given in 
response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony.  In such cases there is no question 
whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant’s will; the witness is told to talk or face the 
government’s coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt.  The information given in response to a grant 
of immunity may well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less 
compelled. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against compelled self-incrimination, not 
merely against unreliable self-incrimination. . . .  Here, . . . we deal with the constitutional privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form.”); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) 
(finding that testimony obtained under a grant of immunity from state prosecution is compelled and thus cannot be 
used in federal prosecution either).
In addition, the Court has constructed several prophylactic rules to protect the exercise of the Fifth 
Amendment.  For example, a defendant’s right to invoke the privilege cannot be made too “costly” by allowing the 
prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s silence.  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965).  In a formal 
sense, the element of compulsion is lacking here because the defendant has taken an action contrary to what the state 
wants him to do.  Still, the Court has prohibited this and other state-imposed burdens where they may make the 
assertion of the right too burdensome.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (stating that no 
negative inferences may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify in the sentencing phase); Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must 
give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ [from the failure to testify] jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so”); 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (holding that the Federal Kidnaping Act, which provided that a 
death sentence could only be imposed through a jury verdict, was unconstitutional because the effect was to 
“discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth 
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (refusing to find that 
it was harmless error for the prosecutor to repeatedly comment on the defendant’s failure to testify); Spevack v. 
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (“In this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine or imprisonment.  It means . . . the 
imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege ‘costly.’”).
41 Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the 
“Preferred Response”, 91 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 535-40 (1982).
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Mandell suggested that different types of compulsion may require different procedures to avoid 
Fifth Amendment violations.42  For example, a state can insist that an individual making a 
compulsory tax filing make the “preferred response” of remaining silent, rather than lying or 
incriminating himself.43  The constitutionally permissible consequences of not making this 
“preferred response” are prosecution for perjury if the individual lies, or admission of the 
incriminating statements against the individual in a prosecution of the substantive crime.44
Where compulsion takes the form of custodial interrogation, however, silence cannot be a 
“preferred response” because a Fifth Amendment claim cannot be asserted through silence in 
such a situation without “risking irreparable injury of the kind the privilege is designed to 
prevent.”45  Westen and Mandell went on to consider several other types of compulsion and the 
requirements for avoiding a Fifth Amendment violation.46  They have, in essence, provided a 
map of what pressure is appropriate under what circumstances.  Whether Westen and Mandell’s 
map turns out to accurately predict the Court’s decisions, we predict that the Court will continue 
the common-law process of locating types of pressure along the its conception of the proper 
continuum and using social conventions to determine whether they are appropriate or 
inappropriate.
B. Incrimination
42 Id. at 535-37.
43 Id. at 532 n.40 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 & n.21 (1976) (concluding that “since Garner 
made disclosures instead of claiming the privilege on his tax returns his disclosures were not compelled 
incriminations.”).
44 Id. at 532-33 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)).
45 Id. at 535-36 (“The state may not insist that a criminal suspect respond to custodial interrogation by remaining 
silent. A suspect who is subjected to station house interrogation is constitutionally entitled to respond to police 
compulsion by making an incriminating statement and later challenging its admission against him at trial. The 
Supreme Court emphasized this point in Miranda v. Arizona.”).
46 Id. at 537-55 (analyzing several situations, including where there is insufficient time to reflect or where a witness 
has reasonably relied on the state’s assurance of immunity).
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The second component necessary to a violation of the Fifth Amendment is incrimination.  
The relevant question is “whether there is a risk that [the person’s] testimony will be used in a 
proceeding that is a ‘criminal case’” in which the person is himself the defendant.47  This 
formulation captures the two sides of this particular coin: 1) there must be a sufficient risk of 
testimonial use, and 2) it must be in a criminal case.  Some proceedings simply are not 
“criminal,” and thus there is no need to appraise the “risk” that compelled testimony will be used 
against the individual.  For example, there is no incrimination where a witness has been granted 
immunity from criminal prosecution but still faces hardships such as the loss of a job” or 
“general public opprobrium.”48  “The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a 
witness is asked to incriminate himself—in other words, to give testimony which may possibly 
expose him to a criminal charge.  But if the criminality has already been taken away the 
Amendment ceases to apply.”49  In addition, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated if the person 
resisting disclosure wishes to protect another natural50 or legal person,51 or where the legal 
regulation is civil and the penalty is not punitive.52
47
 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998).
48
 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956).  See also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949) 
(“If a witness could not be prosecuted on facts concerning which he testified, the witness could not fairly say he had 
been compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.  He might suffer disgrace and humiliation but 
such unfortunate results to him are outside of constitutional protection.”).
49
 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906), cited in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956).  See also, 
Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2000 (2003) (“We fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, 
Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to 
be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”).
50 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (holding that where a taxpayer gave her tax records to 
her accountant, and the “accountant makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the production,” he too 
is precluded from invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protections); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) 
(“the privilege against self-incrimination ‘is solely for the benefit of the witness,’ and ‘'is purely a personal privilege 
of the witness.’  Petitioner expressly placed her original declination to answer on an untenable ground, since a 
refusal to answer cannot be justified by a desire to protect others from punishment, much less to protect another 
from interrogation by a grand jury.”).
51 See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (Whether an entity is entitled to protection turns on an 
inquiry into whether “a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership 
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, 
but rather to embody their common or group interests only.”); George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 
286, 288 (1967) (“the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ‘essentially a personal one, applying only 
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The “risk” part of the “incrimination” component is a variable.  “The central standard for 
the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ 
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.”53  Like compulsion, there is no 
analytical dividing point that can explain why courts find no violation with an incrimination 
likelihood of x, but do find a violation with a quantity of x + 1.  The “substantial and real” test is 
an attempt to locate on the continuum the threshold likelihood of incrimination that will trigger 
the Fifth Amendment protection.  Through case-by-case analysis, the Court has placed various 
types of cases on either side of the threshold.  The threshold has not been met and there is no 
violation where, for example, information disclosures required by statute will not typically result 
in the production of incriminating information,54 the government requires that records in “an 
to natural individuals.’  It ‘cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.’”) (quoting 
White, 322 U.S. at 698-99); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (Communist Party may not claim 
the privilege); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974) (small law partnership may not claim the 
privilege).  But see United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984) (holding that a sole proprietor’s act of 
production may be protected under the privilege).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980) (mere civil liability “does not trigger all the protections 
afforded by the Constitution to criminal defendants.”); United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 
715, 718 (1971) (relying on Boyd v. United States for the proposition that “‘proceedings instituted for the purpose of 
declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in 
form, are in their nature criminal’ for Fifth Amendment purposes” and holding that where “money liability is 
predicated upon a finding of the owner’s wrongful conduct,” the Fifth Amendment may be invoked in forfeiture 
proceedings); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (finding, with regards to the 
registration requirements for members of the Communist Party under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 
that “Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an 
inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might 
involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.”).  
Deportation hearings are probably not “criminal” for Fifth Amendment purposes.  See INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (Noting that a “deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine 
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this 
country is itself a crime” and so  “various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a 
deportation hearing.”); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (“Miranda warnings are not 
applicable in a deportation setting”). 
53
 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
54 See, e.g, California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428-430 (1971) (upholding California’s “hit and run” statute which 
required drivers of cars involved in accidents to stop at the scene and provide their names and addresses because the 
statute “was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising 
from automobile accidents.”  “[T]he mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in 
favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here.”); Baltimore City Department of Social 
Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990) (holding that a mother who refused to produce her child at the 
demand of the Department of Social Services, even though the production may incriminate her in a crime, “may not 
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essentially non-criminal and regulatory area” be kept and disclosed,55 a witness has “a future 
intention to commit perjury . . . if granted immunity because of a claim of compulsory self-
incrimination,”56 self-incriminating information will not be available to law enforcement 
agencies,57 or an individual faces only foreign criminal liability.58  The threshold for Fifth 
Amendment incrimination is met where compliance with a registration act “will significantly 
enhance the likelihood” of prosecution for future acts, and will “readily provide evidence which 
will facilitate” convictions.59  In John Doe’s case, a court would certainly find that knowledge of 
the location of a crime victim is sufficiently incriminating.
C. The Problem of Defining “Testimony”
invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production 
and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.”).
55
 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).  Under the “required records” doctrine, the government can 
require individuals and entities to keep and disclose certain types of records.   For example, the government may 
require that income records be kept and disclosed in tax returns, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), or 
that product pricing information be provided to the government under the Emergency Price Control Act, Shapiro v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).  The Court has allowed disclosure requirements in “required records” cases only 
where incrimination is likely.  To fit within the doctrine, the records must be “customarily kept,” be of a “public 
character,” and be within “an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry.”  Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 56-57.  
In Marchetti, the Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction under federal wagering laws that required disclosure of 
illegal gambling, reasoning that “[t]he United States’ principle interest is evidently the collection of revenue, and not 
the punishment of gamblers; but the characteristics of the activities about which information is sought, and the 
composition of the groups to which inquiries are made, readily distinguish this situation from that in Shapiro” 
because the requirements “are directed to a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.”  Id. at 58 
(internal citation omitted).  See also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (reversing a conviction under the 
National Firearms Act which required registration of illegal weapons because “[t]he hazards of incrimination created 
by the registration requirement [are] ‘real and appreciable.’”).
56
 United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980).
57
 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971) (reversing the dismissal of an indictment for possession of 
unregistered hand grenades; the registration statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment because any risk of 
incrimination was “merely ‘trifling or imaginary’” and not “substantial and real.”).
58 Compare Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 78 (1964) (“the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness 
against incrimination under state as well as federal law”), with United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1998) 
(holding that a suspected Nazi war criminal may not invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination where his 
responses to questions would not subject him to prosecution under domestic law but may make him vulnerable to 
criminal prosecution in Lithuania, Israel, and Germany because “concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the 
scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”).
59
 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
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The third component of a self-incrimination violation is testimony,60 and here is where 
most of the modern theoretical problems lie.  The Court has failed to provide a definition of 
“testimony” that can explain its own cases.  This has led the commentators to wonderfully 
interesting, but uniformly unconvincing, speculation as to what might explain the Fifth 
Amendment.  We discuss here the problems posed for both the Court and the commentators by 
the absence of a plausible conception of “testimony.”  In the next section we solve the riddle by 
showing that testimony, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, is the substantive results of 
cognition, and further that this explains both the cases and the polygraph hypothetical.
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court made an explicit effort to define the 
parameters of “testimony”.61  The defendant in Schmerber appealed his conviction for driving 
under the influence of alcohol on the grounds that his right against self-incrimination had been 
violated when the police ordered a hospital physician to extract the defendant’s blood despite the 
defendant’s refusal to consent.62  A lab test indicated intoxication and was later admitted in 
evidence at trial.63  The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that “the privilege 
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide 
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of 
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.”64
The Court acknowledged that the distinction between “testimony” and “real or physical 
evidence” is not always easily drawn.65  A polygraph test, according to the Court, will measure 
physiological changes during an interrogation and thus the results could be construed as physical 
60 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the 
accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
61
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
62 Id. at 758-59.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 761.
65 Id. at 764.
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or real, like the blood-alcohol test at issue in Schmerber.66  Without remedying this obvious flaw 
in the theory, the Court simply asserted that “[t]o compel a person to submit to testing in which 
an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological 
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”67
The Court did not find any of the same concerns in the blood test under consideration, but 
provided no explanation for why that is so.68 Seventeen years later, the Court still did little more 
than note the polygraph problem when it considered the testimonial/physical distinction in South 
Dakota v. Neville.69  The Court again concluded without explanation that although the lie 
detector test seeks to obtain physical evidence, “to compel a person to submit to such testing ‘is 
to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.’”70  The problem is obvious:  the very 
test that the Court advances, which is to distinguish between “testimony” and “real or physical 
evidence,” does not provide answers as to which is which.
Consider whether anything that was forcefully taken from Doe is “testimonial.”71  The 
only things extracted and presented to the jury were his heart rate, blood pressure, rate of 
breathing, and electrodermal responses.  The physical data obtained through a scientific 
procedure seems analogous to the blood extracted and tested in Schmerber.  If there is a 
difference, the testimonial/real distinction does not get at it.  The test was designed for, and 
succeeded in, excluding physical exemplars72 and medical extractions73 from Fifth Amendment 
protection, but it fails to explain the reoccurring specter of the polygraph.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 765.
69
 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983).
70 Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764).
71 See supra pp. xx-xx.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 
1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. 
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Commentators have tried unsuccessfully to rectify this gap.74  One approach has focused 
on privacy as the core value that should be taken as an indicator of “testimony.”75  Whether or 
not privacy is a core Fifth Amendment value, it obviously cannot explain why the privilege 
applies when it does.  A privacy interest would obviously include the right to exclude the 
government from what’s inside one’s body, like the blood taken in Schmerber.76  In an effort to 
avoid this point, Professor Arenella argued that perhaps “mental privacy,” as distinguished from 
physical privacy, is “at the heart of the privilege.”77  He used both psychological examinations 
and the polygraph as a demonstration of “the futility of trying to separate one’s definition of 
what constitutes testimony for fifth amendment purposes from one’s view of the core values that 
are impaired by permitting testimonial compulsion.”78  Assuming that the “privilege’s primary 
objective is to prevent the state from intruding upon the individual’s mental privacy,” Arenella 
concluded that the privilege should apply where the “state forces the accused to disclose 
involuntarily his private thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about the crime charged and then 
proposes to make testimonial use of these extracted thoughts.”79  His mental-privacy-plus-
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); 
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding that a defendant may be compelled to try on a blouse).
73 See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
74
 For comprehensive evaluations of the many proposed theories, see Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra
note xx;  David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
1063 (1986); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation--And the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 78 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711-18 (1988); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment 
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
75 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 485 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“the Fifth Amendment 
protects an individual citizen against the compelled production of testimonial matter that might tend to incriminate 
him, provided it is matter that comes within the zone of privacy recognized by the Amendment to secure to the 
individual ‘a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.’”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 327 (1973)); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778 (1966) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Thus, the Fifth Amendment marks 
‘a zone of privacy’ which the Government may not force a person to surrender.”).
76
 Arenella, supra note xx, at 40-41 (“While privacy concerns may justify the privilege’s prohibition of testimonial 
compulsion, they do not explain why the state may extract physical evidence from the accused. . . .  When the state 
uses compulsion to extract physical evidence from a suspect and then uses that evidence against him, the state 
intrudes upon the individual’s privacy by gaining physical access to his body and securing information about him.”).
77 Id. at 40-42, cited in Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234 n.18.
78 Id. at 42 n.63, 44.
79 Id. at 43-44  (emphasis in original).
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testimonial-use test seems to give the right answer in the case of John Doe’s polygraph test.  His 
theory, however, cannot overcome the other main problem of privacy-based theories.
The most serious difficulty for the theory that privacy is the explanatory variable is that
the present state of the Fifth Amendment in no way responds to it.  It is indisputable that the 
government has “a right to every man’s evidence,” if that evidence incriminates another person, 
such as a friend or a family member.80  The state can even compel self-incriminating testimony 
with a grant of immunity.81  Given these powers of the government to demand evidence from 
every area of our personal lives, it is hard to see how privacy can be a guidepost for identifying 
where the right against self-incrimination applies.82  These governmental powers also explain the 
failure of theories based on personal autonomy, a variation on privacy theories.83
Arenella asserted that this problem disappears “once one recognizes that the privilege 
only protects against invasions of mental privacy that impair accusatorial process values.”84   By 
this he presumably means that the “accusatorial process norms” that are also core values of the 
privilege, namely things like the “preference for an accusatorial system and fair state-individual 
balance,” explain why the privilege does not apply when immunity is granted or when 
information is sought against a third person.85  The difficulty here is that the argument is ad hoc.  
To explain the cases, it asserts that, when privacy does not work, some other norm trumps it.  But 
80 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (recognizing that the “general common-law principle that 
the public has a right to every man’s evidence” is considered an indubitable certainty) (internal quotations omitted).
81 See id. at 445 (recognizing that immunity statutes “have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence”) 
(citing L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328, 495 (1968)).
82 See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1233-34 (“There are, however, two major stumbling 
blocks to a privacy theory of the privilege. First, the privilege does not protect physical evidence, but instead 
prohibits only compelled “testimonial” or “communicative” conduct. . . .  The second problem is more devastating. 
The privilege applies only to testimony that is incriminating.”); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 388 (1979) (there is a “incoherence 
between the focus of privacy and the Fifth Amendment’s obvious preoccupation with self-incrimination”), quoted in
Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
83 See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234-35.
84
 Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
85 Id. at 40, 40 n.58.
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why? And how will one predict what the next case will bring? In essence, another “value” is 
added to describe each seemingly contradictory case.
Professor Michael Dann tried a different angle for a privacy-focused analysis in his 
criticisms of the testimonial/real distinction.86  He hypothesized that the protection of “one’s 
mental and emotional state including personal thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and information” is the 
“raison d’etre” for the Fifth Amendment privilege.87  A violation of the privilege could be 
detected, he argued, where “psychologically intrusive compulsion occurred.”88  Dann was right 
to look to the nature of the suspect’s involvement rather than whether the character of the 
information derived was real or testimonial.  His theory, however, fails to explain the cases.
Dann’s reason for looking to whether “psychologically intrusive compulsion” has 
occurred is to discover if the “accused can or cannot reasonably believe that he can affect the 
result” of the disclosure.89  If this belief is possible, then the accused will suffer the 
“psychological pain occasioned by forcing an accused” into “the trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt.”90  This argument based on psychological cruelty generally has been 
rejected.91  Dann was concerned not only about the “psychological pain” of the individual, 
86 See B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence 
from a Suspect, 43 U.S.C. L. REV. 597, 598 (1970).  Professors Robert Gerstein and Samuel Alito have presented 
variations on this same argument.  See Gerstein, supra note 33, at 346 n.17 (“What makes an act testimonial is the 
fact-finder’s reliance upon the actor’s oral responsibility for truthtelling in making use of its as evidence.  This, in
turn, must imply the existence of an opportunity to be truthful or not.”), cited in Arenella, supra note 26, at 44 n.70; 
Samuel A. Alito, Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. LAW. REV. 27, 47 (1986) (“A 
person served with a subpoena for incriminating evidence in his possession has three practical alternatives: first, he 
can comply; second, he can claim the fifth amendment privilege; and third, he can falsely deny the existence of the 
evidence or destroy it. . . .  [T]he rational, unscrupulous witness will turn over documents and thus concede 
possession only when that concession is either not incriminating or is believed to reveal no more than can be proved 
independently.”), cited in, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 n.23 (2000)).
87
 Dann, supra note xx, at 611.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 598.
90 Id. at 604 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
91 See Allen The Simpson Affair, supra note xx, at 1016 (describing the theory as “bizarre”) (citing Schulhofer, 
supra note xx, at 318 (“Notice that the innocent defendant faces no trilemma, no dilemma, in fact no problem at 
all.”); Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1237-39.
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though, but also about the likelihood that the person who “has the power to alter the evidence” 
will actually choose to do so and thus undermine the truth-seeking function of criminal 
investigations and trials.92
The focus on choice has practical allure because it can ground the privilege in the 
unassailable goal of promoting the use of reliable evidence in solving and prosecuting crimes.  
The privilege would apply when the witness produces evidence after having the opportunity to 
choose whether to do so honestly.  There are strong policy reasons for not wanting to rely on the 
evidence from someone who has an incentive to hide the truth.  In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, Justice 
Brennan wrote for a majority that “[w]henever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to 
communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 
‘trilemma’ of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) 
contains a testimonial component.”93   [Moved to FN 84]
In an interesting reworking of the choice theory, Professor Stuntz, suggested that the 
Fifth Amendment can be explained as an excuse theory.94  “The central principle underlying 
[excuse] doctrines is that absent a compelling reason to do otherwise,” he explained, “people 
should not be held to a standard higher than that which their judges can meet.”95  In the Fifth 
Amendment context, if “even honest people would commit perjury when asked under oath to 
confess to criminal conduct, then a serious argument for excusing perjury in such cases would 
92 See Dann, supra note xx, at 612.
93
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990).  See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (“Surely the Government is in 
no way relying on the ‘truth-telling’ of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents.”) 
(citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264); Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43, n.23 (again citing Wigmore and describing a 
subpoena duces tecum as a ‘process relying on [the witness’] moral responsibility for truthtelling”)).
94 See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx.
95 Id. at 1229.
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exist.”96  Since there are serious policy problems that would result from excusing perjury, he 
concludes, silence rather than perjury is immunized under the privilege.97
Under Stuntz’s excuse theory, silence is immunized when the person is in a situation in 
which “even honest people” may be tempted to commit perjury.98  This is similar to the choice or 
truthtelling theories to the effect that criminal trials should not rely on the compelled testimony 
of someone with a significant incentive to lie.  Stuntz’s theory does a better job of explaining 
why we immunize silence in criminal cases but allow a defendant with an incentive to lie to 
voluntarily testify in his own defense.  Still, his theory fails to explain both the lie detector 
hypothetical and a number of the cases.
As Arenella pointed out, a theory based on choice cannot explain our John Doe 
hypothetical.99  Doe did not implicate himself after a “cruel” decision was put to him.  Rather, 
the officers were able to extract from him the evidence they needed without his cooperation.  He 
engaged in no “volitional acts” and had no “power to alter the evidence.”100  “Since an effective 
and reliable lie detector test deprives the individual of any opportunity to deceive the 
questioner,” Arenella explained, its results might be admissible under a choice-based theory.101
The “truthtelling” inquiry, even under Stuntz’s theory, fails because “there is no falsehood to 
excuse and therefore no need to immunize noncooperation.”102
More tellingly, these theories fail to explain both the exemplar and the subpoena cases.  
The Court has not extended the privilege to cases where an individual is compelled to give an 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99
 Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
100
 Dann, supra note xx, at 619.
101 See Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
102
 Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1276.
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example of his handwriting, the way he talks, or how he looks in a particular piece of clothing.103
Dann acknowledged that under his theory there should be Fifth Amendment protection in 
exemplar and demonstration cases,104 though this is inconsistent with cases.
Stuntz tried to explain away the problem:
Handwriting and voice samples can be altered, so that if alteration were excusable 
for the same reason as self-protective perjury, noncooperation with the police 
ought to be immunized. On the other hand, it may be that handwriting and voice 
exemplars are outside the scope of the privilege because plausible alteration, 
while possible, is very difficult.105
Dann explained why this doesn’t avoid the problem:
It should not be determinative that “deceit is improbable” in the giving of a voice 
or handwriting sample since such evidence can be disguised.  Even though the 
deceit is successful for only some “talented” people, only some people are able to 
lie successfully.  Such a distinction, however, is irrelevant. . . .  As long as there is 
any possibility of successful deceit, the average person, talented or not, will have 
to decide whether to attempt to disguise the sample; this is precisely the trilemma 
the privilege seeks to guard against.106
Nor do these theories explain the subpoena cases like Fisher. Plainly a person required to 
disgorge possibility incriminating documents has choice and would have the incentive to 
adulterate their contents by purging any incriminatory material, for example, and yet immunity is 
limited to the act of production.107  The polygraph test and exemplar cases all create problems for 
the current theories of the Fifth Amendment.  Privacy- and choice-based theories fail to properly 
predict the outcome of cases.  The next section presents a theory that can explain all of the cases.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 
1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); 
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding that a defendant may be compelled to try on a blouse).
104 See Dann, supra note xx, at 622-25, 627-29.
105
 Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1276-77.
106
 Dann, supra note xx, at 623.
107
 Although as we discuss below, perhaps Hubbell changes things in this regard. Even if it does, the privacy/choice 
theories still cannot explain the other cases discussed in the text.
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D. A Comprehensive Theory of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
As we have been suggesting throughout the earlier sections of this article, a simple 
correction to the understanding of “testimony” produces an explanation of all the cases.  In the 
cases, “testimony” means substantive cognition—the product of cognition that results in holding 
or asserting propositions with truth-value.  Although never expressly formulating a cognition-
based test, the Court has acknowledged that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of information from the 
accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.”108 It has never gone the further step, however, to develop explicitly 
a test based on this observation, but functionally it is precisely what the Court has been doing.109
This leads to the following explanation or theory: The government may not compel revelation of 
the incriminating substantive results of cognition caused by the state.  
Cognition “involves the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of knowledge.”110  We use 
the term here to refer to these intellectual processes that allow one to gain and make use of 
substantive knowledge and to compare one’s “inner world” (previous knowledge) with the 
108
 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (Doe II) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) 
and Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (also 
quoting Couch and Curcio).  See also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) 
(“Physical acts will constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the 
witness.”).
109
 Professor Uviller recognized that “personal control over the production of cognitive evidence, free of official 
coercion, is guaranteed by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.”  H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from 
the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1137 (1987).  He, however, was engaged in a different project when he wrote this and did not follow the idea 
through to a theory of the Fifth Amendment.  Uviller’s article argues that the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment 
cases “misappropriated the right to the services of counsel . . . and deployed it as an awkward and ill-suited restraint 
upon the access of law enforcement officers to the thoughts of a suspect.”  Id. at 1212.  It is not clear whether 
Uviller recognized the importance of his observation about cognition.  His 2001 article on the Fifth Amendment
privilege does not make any explicit mention of “cognition” but he does interpret Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Schmerber as saying that “no one can be forced to divulge cerebral evidence, to speak the contents and products of 
the mind” and emphasizes the Court’s “contents of his own mind” language in Hubbell.  H. Richard Uviller, 
Forward: Fisher Goes on the Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2001).  Though Uviller hasn’t followed through with an examination of the implications of this 
insight, he deserves credit for the observation.
110 MARGARET W. MATLIN, COGNITION 2 (3d ed. 1994).
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“outside world” (including stimuli, such as a question from an interrogator).111  Excluded are 
simple psychological responses to stimuli such as fear, warmness, and hunger; the mental 
processes that produce muscular movements; and one’s will or faculty for choice.
It is important to note that state action is required to trigger both the cognition and the 
disclosure of the results.  There would be nothing objectionable about the police compelling a 
suspect to think about whether he was guilty if the conclusion was never elicited or was 
disclosed voluntarily.  Obversely, even when cognition is involved in the original creation of 
documents, their contents are not directly protected.112  The state must cause the cognition, such 
as that involved in responding to a subpoena, before the Fifth Amendment is implicated.  We 
discuss below how the contents of voluntarily made documents may enjoy derivative protection 
under Hubbell.113  Still, the direct protection extends only to the cognition caused by the state, 
the paradigmatic example being the retrieval of information from memory in response to a 
question.  Finally, only the incriminating substantive results of cognition are protected from 
compelled disclosure.  The fact or quality of cognition is not protected but only those 
propositions with truth-value that would tend to incriminate the author.
Our theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause—that the government may not compel 
revelation of the incriminating substantive results of cognition—can explain all of the cases.  As 
in all theories of the Fifth Amendment, the variables of compulsion114 and incrimination will 
111 Id. at 26 (using these terms in a different context).
112
 United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (“We therefore hold that the contents of those records are 
not privileged.”), quoted in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).
113 See infra pp. xx-xx.
114
 As discussed above, refusals to submit to tests generally lack the component of compulsion because it is the 
opposite result of what the State is seeking.  See supra pp. xx; South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).  Even 
if one could imagine a situation in which a refusal was somehow compelled, however, the refusal would still not 
trigger the privilege for lack of cognition.  An unadorned refusal does not reveal substantive knowledge derived 
from perceptions or ideas.  Though a witness to the refusal may think that it reveals something about the person’s 
knowledge (possibly his own guilt), the additional assumption of the witness does not transform the bare abstention 
into the revelation of cognition.
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exclude some cases from protection categorically, and others when the judicially-created 
threshold is not met.  However, the cases that are problematic for other theories can be explained 
by ours, as can the polygraph hypothetical.
In John Doe’s case, the government would be prohibited from using the polygraph results 
of the unspeaking suspect.  The officer asking questions caused Doe to engage in cognition.  
Though he made no oral responses, his differing physiological responses to suggestions about the 
location of the little girl are a by-product of those thoughts; indeed, the evidence of responses 
would be relevant only if they were a reliable code—a language, in other words—of those 
thoughts.  The officer’s questions caused Doe (outside stimuli) to retrieve his own previous 
knowledge and arrive at answers to the questions.  Despite Doe’s stubborn resistance, the officer 
also compelled the revelation of the substantive results of this cognition by capturing Doe’s 
physiological responses that are a code for his thoughts.  Since the substantive content of his 
thoughts, as reported through those physiological responses, was incriminating, the privilege 
should apply.
The same analysis applies to psychological examinations.  Plainly, the information 
extracted could be considered medical like the blood in Schmerber, but still the privilege is 
implicated.115  The patient is compelled to compare the meaning of the doctor’s statements with 
his own knowledge and experiences and to arrive at incriminating substantive answers which are 
then extracted through compulsion.  In the cases to date, the Court has concluded that those 
answers would be used substantively.  In Estelle v. Smith, the Court “specifically rejected the 
115
 The Court has recognized that, similar to the polygraph, psychological examination can be problematic under the 
testimonial/physical test.   See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983) (“A second example of 
seemingly physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth Amendment protection was presented in Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).  There, we held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected compelled disclosures 
during a court-ordered psychiatric examination.   We specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was 
observing the patient’s communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the 
patient’s statements.”).
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claim that the psychiatrist [in a court-ordered examination] was observing the patient’s 
communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the 
patient’s statements.”116  The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Fifth Amendment was 
inapposite because the defendant’s communications to the doctor were “nontestimonial in 
nature”:
However, Dr. Grigson’s diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not based 
simply on his observation of respondent. Rather, Dr. Grigson drew his 
conclusions largely from respondent’s account of the crime during their interview, 
and he placed particular emphasis on what he considered to be respondent’s lack 
of remorse. Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on 
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting the details of the 
crime.  The Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, is directly involved here 
because the State used as evidence against respondent the substance of his 
disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination.117
Since the substantive results of cognition were compelled and incriminating, the Fifth 
Amendment was violated.  This is precisely as our theory predicts.  We also predict, however, 
that psychological exams that carry no risk of using substantive responses to questions as 
substantive evidence against the accused would not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Consistent with the holding of Schmerber, medical tests are not privileged under this 
theory.  Schmerber can be restated in terms of cognition.  In standard medical exams a 
patient/suspect is not compelled to engage in cognition at all and the test results do not reveal 
any knowledge or substantive results of cognition.  The tests could presumably be performed on 
a totally non-thinking individual.  Although the testimonial/real analysis cannot make the 
necessary distinction between medical and psychological tests, the cognition test shows that only 
the latter should be protected because even the completely uncooperative suspect can be 
compelled to reveal the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition.
116
 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
117
 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1981).
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Exemplar cases also can be explained.  These cases do not trigger the privilege because, 
though the person must understand the command and respond accordingly (comparing the 
outside stimulus with his previous knowledge), no substantive knowledge is dislodged.  When 
one only has to present or refrain from hiding personal characteristics, there is no disclosure of 
the results of cognition.  Signing one’s name or trying on a blouse involves some mental effort in 
understanding the directions and complying with them.  Still, there is no revelation of the 
substantive results of cognition.  All that is revealed is the use of the will or faculty of deliberate 
action to follow directions in signing one’s name normally.  There is no assertion disclosed, only 
the decision to not let one’s will interfere with the naturalness of the response.  This decision is a 
choice and this point highlights the important difference between a cognition-based theory and 
one that relies on the presence of choice.  Choice theories get exemplar cases wrong.118
The Court’s decision in United States v. Doe (Doe II) further demonstrates this point.119
There, a court order compelled a target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to 
disclose records of his accounts.120  The target was compelled to sign a form that “purported to 
apply to any and all accounts over which Doe had a right of withdrawal, without acknowledging 
the existence of any such account.”121  The Court analogized the demand to exemplar cases and 
explained:
We do not disagree with the dissent that “[t]he expression of the contents of an 
individual’s mind” is testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. . . .  We 
simply disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the execution of the consent 
directive at issue here forced petitioner to express the contents of his mind.  In our 
view, such compulsion is more like “be[ing] forced to surrender a key to a 
strongbox containing incriminating documents” than it is like “be[ing] compelled 
to reveal the combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.”122
118 See supra pp. xx-xx.
119
 Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
120 Id. at 202.
121 Id. at 204.
122 Id. at 210 n.9.
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The Court concluded that because the consent directive was not “testimonial in nature,” “the 
District Court’s order compelling petitioner to sign the directive does not violate his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”123  In Doe II, as in exemplar cases, the target 
had to use his will or faculty of deliberate action to follow directions in signing his name.  
Complying with the order, however, did not require Doe to disclose the substantive results of 
cognition.124
Finally, the act of production cases also can be explained.  All subpoenas for documents 
or other tangible evidence involve cognition.  The government, through its issuance of a 
subpoena, causes cognition through the recipient reading the subpoena, comparing its language 
with his own knowledge, and arriving at substantive answers as to which documents satisfy the 
terms of the subpoena.  The government then, through a grant of immunity or threat of contempt, 
compels the disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of that compelled cognition.  
However, the act of production cases do pose unanswered questions about the development of 
the Fifth Amendment.  We turn to these questions in the following section.
Perhaps the only datum not obviously explained by our theory is the sixth birthday 
question in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,125 but it, too, is consistent.  In Muniz, a drunk -driving suspect 
123 Id. at 219.
124 It should be noted that Doe II presents a different situation from California v. Byers, 420 U.S. 424 (1971), though 
both cases involve the compelled presentation of one’s name.  In Byers, California’s “hit and run” statute required 
drivers of cars involved in accidents to stop at the scene and provide their names and addresses.   The driver, like the 
target in Doe II, had to understand the command and respond accordingly by comparing the outside stimulus of the 
accident with his previous knowledge of the law.  In stating his name, however, the driver had to disclose a 
proposition with truth-value, namely, that he had driven the car and gotten into the accident.  Thus, the cognition 
component of a Fifth Amendment violation was present in Byers.  However, because most traffic accidents do not 
create criminal liability, the Court concluded that the risk of incrimination was so low as to not cross the threshold 
necessary for a fifth amendment claim, and thus the statute was upheld. Id. at 428 (upholding the statute because it 
created only a “mere possibility of incrimination,” which was insufficient for a Fifth Amendment violation).   See 
supra note xx and accompanying text.
125
 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
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was arrested and taken to a police station where he was told that his actions and voice would be 
recorded on video, but he was not advised of his Miranda rights.126  This exchange followed:
Officer Hosterman first asked Muniz his name, address, height, weight, eye color, 
date of birth, and current age.   He responded to each of these questions, 
stumbling over his address and age.   The officer then asked Muniz, “Do you 
know what the date was of your sixth birthday?”   After Muniz offered an 
inaudible reply, the officer repeated, “When you turned six years old, do you 
remember what the date was?”   Muniz responded, “No, I don’t.”127
Following this discussion, the police officers performed three sobriety tests that had also been 
done on the roadside.128  The suspect made several incriminating statements reflecting his 
inability to follow directions while trying to perform these tests.129  The Court considered 
whether any of the suspect’s “utterances” constituted “testimonial responses to custodial 
interrogation for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”130  The Court delivered a complex 
web of opinions.  Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, representing four votes.131  Justice 
Rehnquist also represented four votes, joining Brennan’s opinion on some issues and dissenting 
on others.132  Finally, Justice Marshall wrote only for himself, and though providing an important 
vote for the plurality, presented reasoning different from all eight other Justices.
Eight Justices agreed that “any verbal statements that were both testimonial in nature and 
elicited during custodial interrogation should be suppressed” because of the failure by the police 
to advise the suspect of his Miranda rights.133  These same eight all agreed that “[r]equiring a 
suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal 
the physical properties of the sound produced by his voice, does not, without more, compel him 
126 Id. at 585-86.
127 Id. at 586.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 584.
131
 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
132
 Justice Rehnquist was joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
133 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590.
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to provide a ‘testimonial’ response for purposes of the privilege.”134  Citing several exemplar 
cases, the Court held that the fact that the suspect slurred his speech was not protected.135  The 
sobriety tests were also held to be permissible under Schmerber and the statements made during 
the sobriety tests were found to be “voluntary” under Neville since the police did nothing to 
solicit the statements.136  This is all consistent with our theory.
With regard to the first seven questions eliciting the suspect’s name, address, height, 
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age, Justice Brennan, with four votes, asserted that 
the statements and their delivery need not be suppressed because they fall within the routine 
booking exception.137  Rehnquist’s four found that the statements needn’t be suppressed because 
they were not “testimonial.”138  Only Justice Marshall felt the statements should be 
suppressed.139  Again, the decision not to suppress these statements is consistent with our 
theory—no substantive products of cognition were being extracted to be used against the 
defendant.
The most contentious issue was the sixth birthday question, and it is also the greatest 
challenge to us.  Justice Brennan, still representing four votes, found this to be different from the 
first seven questions because it “was incriminating, not just because of his delivery, but also 
because of his answer’s content; the trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he did not 
know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.”140  The questions “required a 
134 Id. at 592 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)).
135
 Id. at 591-92 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)).
136
 Id. at 602 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)).
137
 Id. at 601 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)) (Brennan, J., joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, 
and Kennedy).
138 Id. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens).
139 Id. at 611 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
140 Id. at 592.
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testimonial response” that the state “cared about.”141  Justice Rehnquist’s four dissenters, 
disagreed:
If the police may require Muniz to use his body in order to demonstrate the level 
of his physical coordination, there is no reason why they should not be able to 
require him to speak or write in order to determine his mental coordination.   That 
was all that was sought here.   Since it was permissible for the police to extract 
and examine a sample of Schmerber’s blood to determine how much that part of 
his system had been affected by alcohol, I see no reason why they may not 
examine the functioning of Muniz’s mental processes for the same purpose.142
Justice Marshall cast the deciding vote by concurring with Justice Brennan’s opinion that 
“the ‘sixth birthday question’ required a testimonial response from respondent Muniz.”143
Before concluding that the Court held that Muniz’s response to the sixth birthday question was 
testimonial, however, it is necessary to look more closely at Marshall’s concurrence.  His 
reasoning that differs so dramatically from that of all eight other Justices reveals that the sixth 
birthday question was never decided by a majority of the Court.
Justice Marshall reasoned that everything Mr. Muniz said or did was in the context of 
custodial questioning, and since no Miranda warning was given, all of his incriminating actions 
and statements should have been suppressed.144  Thus, Marshall implicitly agreed with the 
dissenters that no distinction should be drawn between the first seven questions as to Mr. 
Muniz’s name, address, height, etc., the sobriety tests, and the “sixth birthday question,” though 
he disagreed about the consequence of this conclusion.145  More importantly, his concurrence 
141 Id. at 598, 599 n.3.
142 Id. at 607 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
143 Id. at 608 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
144 Id. at 608-609 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
145 See id. (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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reveals the hollowness of his assertion that everything said or done in front of the police officers 
was testimonial.  He admitted:
I continue to have serious reservations about the Court’s limitation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to “testimonial” evidence.  See United States v. Mara, 410 
U.S. 19, 32-38 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  I believe that privilege extends 
to any evidence that a person is compelled to furnish against himself.  At the very 
least, the privilege includes evidence that can be obtained only through the 
person’s affirmative cooperation.  Of course, a person’s refusal to incriminate 
himself also cannot be used against him.146
Marshall wrote that, if Muniz had raised the issue, he would have found that even Muniz’s 
performance of the sobriety tests and his refusal to take the breathalyzer examination violate the 
Fifth Amendment.147  The videotape showing these things should have been suppress, he 
argued.148
Though Marshall cooperatively labeled everything “testimonial” to reach the desired 
result, he explicitly stated in his concurrence that he thought that “[t]he far better course would 
be to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by requiring police to preface all direct questioning of a 
suspect with Miranda warnings” regardless of the type of evidence elicited.149  The rule should 
apply, he urged, when the police delayed processing Mr. Muniz for the purpose of observing 
him, even though no questions were asked, because his actions and statements during this time 
were likely to be incriminating.150  The rule also should apply when Mr. Muniz counted to six 
rather than to thirty as he was instructed, because “his failure to complete the count was 
incriminating in itself.”151  Marshall called all of these things “testimonial” so that as many of 
them as possible would be suppressed within the framework adopted by the rest of the Court.  
146 Id. at 616 n.4 (all but the first internal citation have been omitted) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
147 Id. (Marshall, J. dissenting).
148 Id. (Marshall, J. dissenting).
149 Id. at 610 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
150 Id. at 614 n.2 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
151 Id. at 615 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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Although Marshall stated that the sixth birthday question is testimonial, his vote on this issue is 
undermined by his failure to agree with Brennan about the distinction between this question and
the sobriety tests.  Marshall’s concurrence should be read as a vote for bolstering the Miranda
prophylactic rule, and not as a vote on the competing theories of the testimonial/physical 
evidence distinction.
A holding of the Court that the sixth birthday question violates the Fifth Amendment 
would be inconsistent with our theory (although note that it is the only case that we would not be 
able to explain as compared to other theories that have considerably greater problems in this 
regard).  It is true that cognition is involved in knowing one’s birthday but the revelation of the 
substantive knowledge is not incriminating.  The fact that the suspect had difficulty making the 
calculation reveals nothing about his perceptions or ideas or the knowledge he has derived from 
them.  Incrimination as to the fact of cognition, or the facility or mental dexterity with which one 
engages in cognition, is instead analogous to blood tests.  The privilege does not protect the fact 
or quality of cognition, but only those substantive results that would tend to incriminate the 
author.  Only if Muniz had answered the question, and the content of that answer was somehow 
incriminating, should the privilege have applied.  
However, the Court did not hold that the sixth birthday question violated the Fifth 
Amendment.  That position only received four votes; Justice Marshall’s concurrence should be 
understood as only considering whether the question violated Miranda, which has a broader 
scope than the actual Fifth Amendment protection.152   To be sure, the Muniz Court came close to 
152 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-307 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth 
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.  It may be triggered even in the absence of a 
Fifth Amendment violation. . . .  Thus, in the individual case, Miranda’s preventative medicine provides a remedy 
even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.”).  Though Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000), has clouded the water a bit, Justice Marshall concurred and dissented in Muniz in 1990, after 
Elstad but before Dickerson.
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making a mistake, but did not.  As cases get close to any line, it is not surprising to see opinions 
splinter; that is what we suggest occurred in Muniz.  We also predict the line will not be breached 
in the future.  Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Muniz is inconsistent with the Court’s 
previous, and later, holdings.  Never before or since has the Court held that a physical or 
psychological process deserves protection independent of its substantive results.
II. The Remaining Ambiguities: Thresholds for Cognition and the Extent of Derivative 
Use
As the previous section demonstrated, notwithstanding all the hand wringing over the 
chaotic state of Fifth Amendment theory, the cases are quite consistent and explained by a fairly 
simple theory.  Three years ago, however, the Court handed down what appeared to be a highly 
technical result, but which in fact had explosive potential—so explosive that if developed it 
could essentially mean the end of subpoenas to targets of criminal investigations.  This was 
United States v. Hubbell.153  Interestingly, what makes Hubbell so potentially significant is  the 
possibility that it embraces precisely the theory we have laid out in this article, and carries it to 
its logical extension by bringing all derivative evidence within its scope.  The Court’s opinion 
was in the vocabulary of traditional Fifth Amendment case law, and the case purported to be 
nothing more than an application of the Fisher act of production doctrine.154  The Court 
essentially held, however, that anything produced from compelled cognition that itself was 
protected, would be immunized under the Fifth Amendment.  This seems to reverse Fisher’s 
conclusion that, at least in the context of subpoenas, the compelled cognition, but not its fruits, 
153
 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
154 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (recognizing that “[t]he act of producing evidence in response to 
a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own”).
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would be immunized.155  We say “seems” because there is an alternative explanation that may 
explain the two cases: perhaps the Court will conceive of cognition, like compulsion and 
incrimination, as a variable with a threshold that must be passed before the Fifth Amendment is 
violated.  These are the remaining sources of ambiguity.  We elaborate on them in this section, 
and explain how they arose.  In the next section, we present the Court’s options and predict what 
it is likely to do.
In the act of production cases, the Court has flirted with various ways of limiting the 
reach of “testimony,” but never has arrived at a satisfactory answer or comprehensible 
explanation.  Professor Cole lamented that in Fisher and the later act of production doctrine 
cases, the Court “declined to articulate a test of general application that the lower courts could 
use to assess the testimonial value of the act of producing documents.”156  This is because a 
consistent “testimonial communications” test cannot be articulated given the Court’s 
understanding of the term.  By contrast, cognition as a test of this third component permits a 
threshold to be set to exclude some cases from protection.  We elaborate these points here.  First, 
we explicate the crooked path from Fisher to Hubbell and its significance for the reach of the 
Fifth Amendment.  We then show how cognition is the key to understanding the progression.
155
 Justice O’Connor expressed the view that the fruits of a “mere” Miranda violation need not be suppressed.  See 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660-74 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor made it clear that 
though evidence derived from Miranda violations is properly admissible, derivative evidence from actual Fifth 
Amendment violations should be suppressed.  “The values underlying the privilege may justify exclusion of an 
unwarned person’s out-of-court statements, as perhaps they may justify exclusion of statements and derivative 
evidence compelled under the threat of contempt.  But when the only evidence to be admitted is derivative evidence 
such as a gun—derived not from actual compulsion but from a statement taken in the absence of Miranda 
warnings—those values simply cannot require suppression, at least no more so than they would for other such 
nontestimonial evidence.”  Id. at 671 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Fisher suggested that, in the context of document 
subpoenas, the fruits are never immunized.  See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.  United States v. Doe (Doe II) made it clear 
that the content of subpoenaed documents are not protected.  487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988) (“It is undisputed that the 
contents of the foreign bank records sought by the Government are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment.”) 
(citing Fisher, among other cases).
156
 Cole, supra note xx, at 149, 162.
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In United States v. Fisher, the Court concluded that the act of producing things demanded 
by the government through subpoenas may merit Fifth Amendment protection.157  In Fisher, the 
Court addressed whether a summons demanding production of documents created by an 
accountant for a taxpayer could be resisted on Fifth Amendment grounds.158  The Court found 
that the content of subpoenaed documents was not protected but that “[t]he act of producing 
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly 
aside from the contents of the papers produced.”159  “Compliance with the subpoena tacitly 
concedes” the existence, possession or control, and authenticity of the documents delivered.160
The Court held, however, that compliance with the summons in the case at hand “would involve 
no incriminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”161
In reaching this conclusion, the Court revealed its concern about the possible 
expansiveness of the act of production doctrine.162  Without providing a satisfactory explanation 
for its conclusion, the Court embraced a constricted act of production doctrine, mentioning two 
aspects of the case that presumably affected the outcome.  First, compliance with the subpoena 
was not “testimony” because the papers were not the defendant’s “private papers” but rather had 
been created by an accountant.  This fact is meant to distinguish Fisher from Boyd v. United 
States.163  In Boyd, the Court announced a very broad privilege for individuals’ “private books 
and papers.”164  Since the Boyd Court included within this protection a subpoenaed business 
157 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.  For a full account of the history of the act of production doctrine, see Thomas Kiefer 
Wedeles, Note, Fishing for Clarity in a Post-Hubbell World: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule in the Self-
Incrimination Clause’s Act of Production Doctrine, 56 VAND. L. REV. 613, 620-26 (2003).
158 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-95.
159 Id. at 410.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 414.
162 See id. at 411-12.
163
 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
164 Id. at 634-35.
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invoice, this is hardly a persuasive distinction.165  In fact, Justice White, writing for the majority, 
stated dismissively that “[s]everal of Boyd’s express or implicit declarations have not stood the 
test of time.”166  Justice O’Connor and others have since stated that Fisher “sounded the death-
knell for Boyd.”167  The holding in Fisher narrowed the scope of the privilege dramatically from 
what essentially had been a broad “zone of privacy” recognized in Boyd.168
The second factor affecting Fisher’s outcome, according to the Court, was that the 
“existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or 
nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the 
papers.” 169  This also effectively limited the scope of “testimony,” and thus of the reach of the 
Fifth Amendment, but it left unclear what precisely would be protected.170  Were these necessary 
or sufficient conditions? If the former, how did they interact?  If the latter, what was the scope of 
the “foregone conclusion” rationale?  Indeed, commentators thought that perhaps the real point 
of Fisher was to bring an end to the Boyd era, and not simply to extend it through a different 
vocabulary.171
165 See id. at 618.
166 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407.
167 United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The notion that the Fifth 
Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd v. United States but our decision in Fisher v. United 
States sounded the death-knell for Boyd.”).  See also Stanton D. Krauss, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United 
States (1888-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 184 (1977) (“Thus, in light of Andresen and Fisher, Boyd is dead.  No 
zone of privacy now exists that the government cannot enter to take an individual’s property for the purpose of 
obtaining incriminating information.”).
168 See Krauss, supra note xx, at 184.
169 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411, 414.
170
 Scholars have adopted this language as the basis for a foregone conclusion doctrine that is proclaimed to be 
central to the act of production doctrine.  This claim has become quite common since Hubbell and is considered at 
the end of this section after discussion of that case.  See infra pp. xx – xx.
171 See, e.g, Gerstein, supra note xx, at 343 (“The venerable opinion of Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 
much celebrated and much maligned through its long history, has at last been deprived of its remaining vitality by 
the Burger Court.”) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973)); Krauss, supra note xx, at 212 (declaring that after Andresen 
and Fisher, “Boyd is dead”); Cole, supra note xx, at 133 (describing the judicial abandonment of Boyd, culminating 
with Fisher); Mosteller, supra note xx, at 504 n.73 (describing how Boyd was “dismantled”).
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In United States v. Doe (Doe I), the Court for the first time, and to the surprise of many, 
upheld the invocation of the privilege based on the act of production, thus indicating that the 
reports of Boyd’s demise were greatly exaggerated.172  The owner of several sole proprietorships 
received subpoenas requiring production of several categories of business documents.173  The 
owner’s motion to quash was granted by the District Court upon a finding “that the act of 
production would compel respondent to “admit that the records exist, that they are in his 
possession, and that they are authentic.”174  The Supreme Court deferred to the lower court’s 
“determination of factual issues” and affirmed the granting of the motion.175
The Court’s decisions in the years following Doe I gave a curious gloss to the act of 
production doctrine.  It emphasized that “in order to be ‘testimonial,’ an accused’s oral or written 
communication, or act, must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose 
information.”176  Yet, in two cases where clearly incriminating communications were at issue, 
the Court seemed to find the privilege inapplicable.  In Braswell v. United States, the Court 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no 
act of production privilege under the fifth amendment regarding corporate documents” and thus 
“may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.”177  The Court 
distinguished Doe I: 
Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole proprietorship, Doe would require 
that he be provided the opportunity to show that his act of production would entail 
testimonial self-incrimination.   But petitioner has operated his business through 
the corporate form, and we have long recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth 
172
 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
173 Id. at  606-07.
174 Id. at  608.
175 Id. at  614.
176
 Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 202, 210 (1988) (holding that “a court order compelling a target of a 
grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts, without identifying those 
documents or acknowledging their existence” does not violate the target's Fifth Amendment privilege.)
177
 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 101, 109 (1988) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193
(5th Cir. 1987)).
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Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently from 
individuals.   This doctrine—known as the collective entity rule—has a lengthy 
and distinguished pedigree.178
The petitioner in Braswell was the sole shareholder of his two companies and he, his wife, and 
his mother, were the only directors.179  His wife and mother held the positions of secretary-
treasurer and vice-president of the corporations, respectively, and “neither ha[d] any authority 
over the business affairs of either corporation.”180  Thus, the Court seems to say that a person 
may not invoke the privilege, even if the production would be “personally incriminating,” if he 
has chosen one corporate form over another.181  This disturbingly formalistic approach led the 
dissent to criticize the majority for being “captive to its own fictions.”182
Braswell was another unpersuasive effort to limit the privilege, as ironically the majority 
itself seemed to admit.  Despite the unequivocal statement that the act of production would 
afford corporate custodians no Fifth Amendment protection, the Court undid its entire opinion in 
a last qualifying paragraph:
Although a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground 
that his act of production will be personally incriminating, we do think certain 
consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s act of production is one in 
his representative rather than personal capacity.   Because the custodian acts as a 
representative, the act is deemed one of the corporation and not the individual.   
Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it may make no evidentiary 
use of the “individual act” against the individual.  For example, in a criminal 
prosecution against the custodian, the Government may not introduce into 
evidence before the jury the fact that the subpoena was served upon and the 
corporation’s documents were delivered by one particular individual, the 
custodian.183
178 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
179 Id. at 101.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 113.
182 Id. at 130 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
183 Id. at 117-18.
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This amounts to an implicit grant of use immunity: in a criminal trial, the custodian’s act of 
production cannot be used against him personally.  If the privilege applies, why did the Court 
state that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no act of production privilege 
under the fifth amendment”?184  As Justice Kennedy commented, “[t]his exercise admits what 
the Court denied in the first place, namely, that compelled compliance with the subpoena 
implicates the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.”185
The Court revealed this same uncertainty about applying the act of production doctrine in 
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.186  After holding that a mother may 
not invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist a court order to produce her child, whom authorities 
feared had been abused and possibly killed, the Court again ended its opinion with a cryptic 
qualification:
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the 
State’s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight’s act of production in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.   But we note that imposition of such limitations 
is not foreclosed.   The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the 
production order may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and 
indirect use of that testimony.187
As in Braswell, the Court concluded that the State was not required to grant immunity ex 
ante but implied that ex post it might, thus leaving the state of the law unclear.188  The puzzles 
are obvious.  First, the cases may have produced a judicially-created form of immunity, not 
constrained by statute, which can be recognized ex post by judges evaluating a prosecutor’s 
proposed use of the evidence.  It seems unlikely that this was the Court’s intent, however, given 
that in its earlier decision in Doe I, it declined to adopt a “doctrine of constructive immunity” 
184 Id. at 102, 113 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1987)).
185 Id. at 119 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
186
 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
187 Id. at 561.
188 See id. at 561-62 (citing cases where the Fifth Amendment was found to limit prosecutors’ ability to use 
testimony that has been compelled even where no statutory immunity has been granted).
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under which “the courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to use the 
incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even 
though the statutory procedures have not been followed.”189
Alternatively, perhaps the Court was trying in Bouknight and Braswell to be faithful to 
the very narrow act of production doctrine of Fisher, but stumbled because of the lack of a clear 
understanding of the nature of the very distinctions the Court was attempting to draw.  Through 
our theory—that the government may not compel revelation of the incriminating substantive 
results of compelled cognition—the debate underlying these cases can be better understood.  In 
both Bouknight and Braswell the government sought to compel production of evidence through a 
court order.  To compel such a response is to compel cognition by forcing the recipient of the 
subpoena/order to read the subpoena, compare its language with his own knowledge, and arrive 
at substantive answers as to which documents or physical items satisfy the terms of the order.  
The government would then compel revelation of the presumably incriminating results of this 
compelled cognition.  The only remaining questions are whether the level of cognition meets 
some threshold, and what the derivative consequences are if it does.  
Some scholars have suggested that the scope of the Fifth Amendment should be confined 
to explicit “testimonial use” and have little or no derivative consequences.  Professor Arenella 
explained that a violation would only occur, or conversely immunity should only be granted, 
where the government seeks to make “testimonial use” of an actor’s “thoughts, feelings, and 
beliefs.”190  Similarly, Amar and Lettow suggested an approach limiting what is presented at 
trial:
[T]he Court should move beyond the way station of Kastigar and declare that a 
person’s (perhaps unreliable) compelled pretrial statements can never be 
189
 United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984).
190
 Arenella, supra note xx, at 44.
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introduced against him in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements 
virtually always can be.  Thus, the government should be allowed to require a 
suspect to answer relevant questions in a civilized pretrial hearing presided over 
by a judge or magistrate.  Under penalty of contempt, a suspect must answer 
truthfully, but he will be entitled to ‘testimonial immunity’:  that is, the compelled 
words will never be introduced over the defendant’s objection in a criminal trial –
the defendant will never be an involuntary ‘witness’ against himself ‘in’ a 
‘criminal case’ – but the fruits of these compelled pretrial words will generally be 
admissible.191
Amar and Lettow declared that the Court was “leaning” in this direction.192  The Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in United States v. Hubbell, in an opinion with potentially astonishing 
implications, is to the contrary.193
Webster Hubbell pleaded guilty to tax evasion and mail fraud in 1994 and promised, as 
part of his plea agreement, to provide the Independent Counsel with “full, complete, accurate, 
and truthful information” about the investigation into the Whitewater Development 
Corporation.194  While Hubbell was serving his twenty-one-month sentence, the Independent 
Counsel tried to determine whether the agreement to provide information had been violated by 
serving Hubbell with a subpoena duces tecum calling for eleven categories of documents.195
Hubbell appeared before an Arkansas grand jury but invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.196
The prosecutor presented a § 6003 order from the District Court, granting Hubbell immunity “to 
the extent allowed by law” and ordering him to respond to the subpoena.197  Hubbell produced 
13,120 pages of documents and asserted, “those were all of the documents in his custody or 
control that were responsive to the commands in the subpoena . . . .”198
191
 Amar & Lettow, supra note xx, at 858-59.
192 Id. at 858.
193
 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
194 Id. at 30.
195 Id. at 31.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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In 1998 a new grand jury returned an indictment for tax-related crimes as well as mail 
and wire fraud.199  Though the contents of the documents produced by Hubbell “provided the 
Independent Counsel with the information that led to this second prosecution, the government 
asserted that in the criminal case against Hubbell “it would not have to advert to [Hubbell’s] act 
of production in order to prove the existence, authenticity, or custody” or to even “introduce any 
of the documents” into evidence.200  The question before the Court was whether Hubbell’s “act 
of production immunity” would pose a “significant bar” to prosecution.201  Since “the scope of 
‘use and derivate-use’ immunity that [§ 6002] provides is coextensive with the scope of the 
constitutional privilege,” the real issue was the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.202  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the indictment.203
The Court found that the prosecution was barred from producing at trial Hubbell’s 
response to the subpoena or the fact of his having produced the evidence.204  “That would surely 
be a prohibited ‘use’ of the immunized act of production.”205  The Court went further, however, 
and found it “clear” that the government had “already made ‘derivative use’ of the testimonial 
aspect of that act in obtaining the indictment against the respondent and in preparing its case for 
trial.”206  “[I]t is undeniable,” the Court wrote, “that providing a catalog of existing documents 
fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with 
a ‘lead to incriminating evidence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.’”207
Although the Court asserted, as it had in prior cases, that the contents of the documents were not 
199 Id.
200 Id. at 31, 41.
201 Id. at 33.
202 Id. at 38.
203 Id. at 32-34.
204 Id. at 41.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 42.
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privileged,208 the contents themselves did provide the link.  “The contents of the documents 
produced by respondent provided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to this 
second prosecution.”209
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed the nature of Hubbell’s actions in 
responding to the subpoena.210  It observed:
It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of “the 
contents of his own mind” in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to 
the requests in the subpoena.  The assembly of those documents was like telling 
an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the 
key to a strongbox.  The Government’s anemic view of respondent’s act of 
production as a mere physical act that is principally nontestimonial in character 
and can be entirely divorced from its “implicit” testimonial aspect so as to 
constitute a “legitimate, wholly independent source” (as required by Kastigar) for 
the documents produced simply fails to account for these realities.211
In other words, the Court concluded that the government had, through its issuance of a subpoena, 
caused cognition when the recipient read the subpoena, compared its language with his own 
knowledge, and arrived at substantive answers as to which documents satisfied the terms of the 
subpoena.  The government then compelled the disclosure of the incriminating substantive 
results of this compelled cognition through a grant of immunity.
The dramatic change from Fisher to Hubbell is now plain.  Fisher suggested a high 
threshold for cognition and a limited derivative use doctrine.  A substantial use of knowledge 
would be required before the privilege would apply, and the scope of immunity would be limited 
to the bare act of production.  The privilege’s applicability to interrogations and confessions was 
unaffected because these cases necessarily involve significant use of knowledge and could 
themselves be used substantively at trial.  Where the individual only had to respond 
208 Id. at 36 n.18.
209 Id. at 31.
210 Id. at 43-44.
211 Id. at 43 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201 
(1988)).
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mechanically to an order, as in Fisher, the response to subpoenas was either below the minimal 
threshold for cognition, evidentially irrelevant, or some combination of the two.  The Court in 
Fisher implied that there might be a situation in which the act of production would involve 
sufficient cognition so that the threshold would be met, although it also suggested that this would 
not be common.  Thus in Fisher, although the subject of the subpoena had to read, understand, 
and respond to the contents of the subpoena—all of which require cognition as we use the
term—the Court concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment protection for the act of 
production itself, and consequently, not for the contents of the disclosed documents.  Following 
Fisher, then, cognition appeared to be a variable requiring some minimal threshold, and the 
scope of derivative use, while unclear, seemed constricted.
In Hubbell, the Court took a dramatic new step in concluding that no derivative use at all 
could be made of the incriminating substantive results of Hubbell’s cognition.  The attachment of 
derivative use to the “testimony” component significantly expanded the potential scope of 
protection, suggesting that the two cases are in direct tension with each other.  Justices Thomas 
and Scalia, concurring in Hubbell, expressed a willingness to reconsider Fisher,212 but the 
majority made a half-hearted effort to distinguish the case.213  In Fisher, the Court explained, the 
“existence and location of the papers” was a “foregone conclusion.”214  Without doing much to 
explain their rationale, the Court simply stated that it did not apply to Hubbell’s situation.215
212 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“None of the parties in this case has asked us to depart from 
Fisher, but in light of the historical evidence that the Self-Incrimination Clause may have a broader reach than 
Fisher holds, I remain open to a reconsideration of that decision and its progeny in a proper case.”)
213 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45.
214 Id. at 44 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411).
215 See id. at 44.
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If we look to the subpoenas at issue in these cases,  we find no support for a categorical 
distinction.  In Fisher, the Court considered appeals in two cases from two Circuits.  In United 
States v. Kasmir, the subpoena considered by the Fifth Circuit ordered production of: 
1. Accountant’s work papers pertaining to Dr. Mason’s books and records of 
1969, 1970, and 1971. 
2. Retained copies of Dr. Mason’s income tax returns for 1969, 1970, and 1971. 
3. Retained copies of reports and other correspondence between (the accounting 
firm) and Dr. Mason during 1969, 1970, and 1971. 216
In United States v. Fisher, the subpoena considered by the Third Circuit required the recipient:
‘to give testimony relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability’ 
of Morris Goldsmith and to bring with him, among other things, an ‘Analysis of 
Receipts and Disbursements for Morris Goldsmith for 1969 and 1970’ and an 
‘Analysis of the Receipts and Disbursements of Sally Goldsmith for 1969 and 
1970.’217
The Hubbell subpoena demanded documents in several areas including:
C. Copies of all bank records of Webster Hubbell, his wife, or children for all 
accounts from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not limited to all 
statements, registers and ledgers, cancelled checks, deposit items, and wire 
transfers.
 D. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to time worked or 
billed by Webster Hubbell from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not 
limited to original time sheets, books, notes, papers, and/or computer records.218
All three of these subpoenas require cognition.  There may be differences in the quantity of 
documents to be produced and the length of time it will take to gather them.  Yet, each subpoena 
recipient will be required to determine which documents fit the description of the subpoena.  In 
Kasmir, the prosecutor presumably knew that there were “accountant’s work papers” and that 
they were likely in the accountant’s possession.  Still, there was no “foregone conclusion” about 
any particular document.  The Hubbell subpoena is similar, differing only by degree.
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Commentators have given much weight to the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, arguing 
that it creates a useful dichotomy.219  Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing Fisher from 
Hubbell, Cole wrote, “the difference between the two cases, if any, arises out of the application 
of the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine.”220  Although disappointed that the Court had “declined to 
provide a definitive answer,” Cole concluded that “[b]y recognizing the extent of the 
Government’s prior knowledge as the critical inquiry for purposes of the application of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, the Court effectively resolved the issue of when the doctrine 
should apply.”221  Proceeding to lay out the “analytical framework mandated by Hubbell,” Cole 
presented a three-part test.222  The second and third phases asked about the presence of 
incrimination and compulsion, respectively.223  “Phase One” of the inquiry asked “whether the 
act of production has sufficient testimonial value to be protected by the Fifth Amendment, or 
stated differently, whether the testimonial information that would be conveyed is a ‘foregone 
conclusion’ because the government has ‘prior knowledge’ of that information.”224  In the 
context of document production, Cole equated the “testimonial” component with “prior 
knowledge” by the government.
Robert Mosteller, also concluded that the foregone conclusion doctrine is at the center of 
the analysis.225  Mosteller interpreted Hubbell as holding that “when the prosecution does not 
have specific information about the existence of incriminating documents, demanding them 
219 See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.13 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2002) (discussing the importance 
of the “foregone conclusion doctrine); Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating 
Evidence: The Consequences and Corrections of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 508-10 (2001); Cole, supra 
note xx, at 151.
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violates the Fifth Amendment.”226  He concluded that “[n]ow the important battle is the 
determination of the extent of prosecutorial knowledge necessary to establish that the existence 
of the documents is a ‘foregone conclusion.’”227  He joined this battle and presented a complex 
hypothesis of how the foregone conclusion doctrine can work in practice.228
The “foregone conclusion” doctrine almost surely cannot sustain this weight.  First, it is 
hard to read the Court’s opinion as providing much support.  The Court never suggests that its 
holding is based on a foregone conclusion analysis, its only reference to it being the half-hearted 
and rather dismissive comment that, “[w]hatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ 
rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it.”229  More importantly, the argument 
leads to unacceptable results.  If the information sought is evidentially important, then it cannot 
matter how much the government already knows.230  Under Mosteller’s and Cole’s analysis, the 
government could presumably compel oral confessions if it had other evidence of what the 
defendant knew or would say.  In John Doe’s polygraph case, there would be no violation if the 
government already had the little girl’s body and substantial evidence of Doe’s guilt, but merely 
wanted to solidify the case against him.
By contrast, the foregone conclusion doctrine makes more sense if it is understood as 
directed toward the witness’s cognitive efforts rather than the government’s knowledge.  The 
doctrine does not define a difference in kind between types of subpoenas; rather, it highlights 
that cognitive demands may vary between different subpoenas.  A subpoena that demands 
226 Id. at 492.
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production of a very specific document kept in a very specific location requires very little mental 
effort.  The individual must only compare the language of the request to his own knowledge of 
the document sought.  A more vague or more wide-ranging subpoena requires greater cognitive 
effort.  The individual must interpret the meaning of the request, sort though large numbers of 
documents, and try to determine if a variety of documents can all fit within the parameters of a 
request.
III. The Future
How Fisher and Hubbell relate—and thus the future of the Fifth Amendment—is unclear 
on two fronts.  First, is cognition a variable like compulsion and incrimination?  In what may 
prove to be the single most important word in the opinion, the Court referred to the “extensive” 
effort that Hubbell had to make to respond to the subpoena.231  Perhaps less extensive efforts will 
not meet the required threshold, and the location of the breaking point will be determined 
through a common-law process.  The second issue is the scope of derivative immunity—how far 
will the causal consequences of cognition extend?  These two issues may be dependent or 
independent.  The extensiveness of cognitive effort may result in a more extensive derivative use 
protection, or  the permissible derivative use may remain constant so long as the threshold of 
cognition is met.  These two variables point the way to the future.
There are three possible directions in which the law can evolve.  First, the Court may 
choose to follow Fisher in both respects.  This would limit the privilege to situations where the 
bare act of production is itself incriminating, and would permit derivative use.  Second, the Court 
may follow Hubbell in both respects.  This would extend the privilege to all cases where the 
substantive contents of cognition is compelled, and create a broad derivative use doctrine.  Third, 
231 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
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the Court might embrace the derivative use aspect of Hubbell and couple it with a requirement of 
“extensive” cognition.  Doing so would raise the related question of the relationship between the 
two variables—as the extent of the compelled substantive cognition increases, does the scope of 
protection for the derivative consequences increase as well?
The practical consequences of these different choices are obvious.  If the Court embraces 
Fisher, and comes to view Hubbell as an aberration, the privilege will be substantially curtailed 
with regard to subpoenas.  A reductionist view of the act of production doctrine and the nature of 
a compelled act would result.  All complexities and conditions would be obscured or ignored so 
that a bare act would seem to carry no significance.  The context of the compelled disclosure 
would be shielded from view so that the government could act as though it obtained the evidence 
through its own independent efforts.  Following the Fisher approach, no preexisting documents 
would be protected.  The government would only be limited in the way that it described to a trier 
of fact how it came into possession of the documents.  The government could use compelled 
evidence if it were treated as though it arrived like “manna from heaven,” “by assuming that it 
miraculously appeared in the district attorney’s office.”232  The Fifth Amendment would be 
orderly and curtailed. Where compulsion or incrimination is missing or below the required 
threshold, there would be no privilege.  Only where there is compulsion, incrimination, and a 
high level of cognition, such as in John Doe’s polygraph case or a psychological test, would the 
privilege apply.  At the low end of the cognition scale, in the context of subpoenas for example, 
the privilege would not apply.  The government would continue to be able to use subpoenas to 
compel incriminating evidence.  The substance of the evidence, such as the contents of the 
documents or the condition of the child in Bouknight, would not be protected.
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If Hubbell dominates the future, and every response to a subpoena is determined to 
involve sufficient cognition to implicate the privilege, which in turn is coupled with 
extensivederivative use protection, the scope of the Fifth Amendment will be so large as to 
swallow subpoenas.  Uviller recognized with dismay that Hubbell’s derivative protection “comes 
perilously close to treating the contents of a document as the indirect product of its 
production.”233  As the Court stated in Hubbell, it was the “contents of the documents produced 
by respondent” that “provided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to his 
second prosecution.”234  But this means that no subpoena can be enforced over a Fifth 
Amendment objection without a grant of immunity.  The grant of immunity in turn would make 
it next to impossible to prosecute the subject of a subpoena.235
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by- witness; if necessary, it will proceed line-by-line and item-by-item. For each grand jury and 
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whatsoever was made of any of the immunized testimony either by the witness or by the Office of 
Independent Counsel in questioning the witness. This burden may be met by establishing that the 
witness was never exposed to North’s immunized testimony, or that the allegedly tainted 
testimony contains no evidence not “canned” by the prosecution before such exposure occurred.  
Unless the District Court can make express findings that the government has carried this heavy 
burden as to the content of all of the testimony of each witness, that testimony cannot survive the 
Kastigar test. We remind the prosecution that the Kastigar burden is “heavy” not because of the 
evidentiary standard, but because of the constitutional standard: the government has to meet its 
proof only by a preponderance of the evidence, but any failure to meet that standard must result in 
exclusion of the testimony.  Id. at 872-73.
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If the Court chooses to follow this approach, again we can expect it to decide cases in a 
relatively orderly fashion.  As under Fisher, there would be no privilege where either compulsion 
or incrimination was missing.  The polygraph and psychological examination cases will also be 
decided the same under both approaches.  The privilege will apply because of the sufficient level 
of cognition.  The privilege will not be applicable in exemplar cases under either approach as 
long as the plurality decision in Muniz on the sixth birthday question is wrong.  If Hubbell and 
the plurality in Muniz are both right then all aspects of incriminating forced reasoning can 
constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment.  If Hubbell is right and the plurality in Muniz is 
wrong, however, then the Fifth Amendment would apply to every subpoena that demands 
information that incriminates the recipient.  The quality of the recipient’s reasoning, or his 
mental or intellectual aptitude, however, would not fall within the scope of the privilege.  The 
privilege would remain concerned only with disclosure of the substantive results of cognition.
The third possibility is that neither Fisher nor Hubbell sets the right threshold for 
cognition.  Hubbell locates the threshold much lower on the continuum than does Fisher.236
There is broad continuum of possibilities between the two extremes and the Court may try to find 
a different spot in the middle, and perhaps the future will turn on Justice Stevens’ comment that 
“[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his 
own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the 
subpoena.”237  It may be that the entire impact of Hubbell will be contained in the word
“extensive.”  Future cases would search out the meaning of this term, looking for a location for 
the threshold.  As an inherently relative term, “extensive” can never provide a clear definition.  It 
would require courts to continuously analogize and distinguish the facts of future cases, 
236 See Mosteller, supra note xx, at 521 (suggesting a different analysis but also recognizing that Fisher and Hubbell
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gradually limiting the possibilities for the variable. The remaining question would then be 
whether the extent of cognition related to the extensiveness of derivative use protection.  The 
answer to that question would in turn determine whether subpoenas would ever issue for targets 
of investigation.
How will the Court choose between these possibilities?  Almost certainly it will do so in 
light of the “felt necessities of the times.”238  A broad reading of Hubbell coupled with a robust 
derivative use doctrine will increase the protections of the Fifth Amendment but also the costs of 
investigations, and vice versa.  We thus predict that the Court will see both cognition and 
derivative use as variables that interact.  As the government makes more cognitive demands on 
the subject of a subpoena, the probability will increase of both that the act of production is 
compelled “testimony” and that the derivative fruits are protected.  This will mean that two new 
common-law lines of cases will have to be developed.  This will have its own costs, including 
the lack of a clear a priori rule.  Nonetheless, if what we predict comes to pass, it will have the 
effect—and some might say the virtue—of capturing the notion that the protection of the citizen 
increases as the government makes greater demands. 
One last substantive point. It has also not escaped our notice that our theory may pose the 
next hypothetical that may bedevil Fifth Amendment scholars.  Suppose the state could capture 
the product of cognition that it did not cause.239  Suppose that the next “lie detector” machine 
reads minds and captures incriminating thoughts even when no questions are asked.  Does the 
causal difference of the state action between this and the original lie detector hypothetical (where 
questions are asked that cause the cognition that in turn causes the physiological responses) make 
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a difference?  Interestingly, not only our positive explanation of the Fifth Amendment but many 
other constitutional holdings suggest that it does.  Our revised hypothetical looks much more like 
a search than an interrogation, which is precisely the line drawn by cases such as Andresen v. 
Maryland.240
If there is a normative justification for the positive theory we have developed here, using 
the terms as conventionally used in legal scholarship, we suspect that it resides in the point noted 
above that one effect of the Court’s opinions is, and we predict will be, to maintain a relationship 
between the demands made by government and the protection afforded citizens, however prosaic 
that may appear. This raises the pointed question whether the ease with which the fifth 
amendment cases can be given a positive explanation, and their intractability to standard efforts 
at “normative justification” casts doubt on whether grand legal theorizing is very useful in any 
field of law with the range of either the fourth or fifth amendment, and, relatedly, whether
scholarly efforts to discover the truth in this regard are doomed to failure.  This does not mean 
that fields of law are necessarily unjustified, but instead that the justification, if it exists, must 
come in other terms.  The terms plainly applicable to these two areas are the traditional ones of 
the rule of law.  The Court has strived to make sense of ambiguous directives through creating 
and sustaining legal categories that for the most part are recognizable and by responding to new 
situations through analogies to prior cases.  The applicable terms in which to appraise or criticize 
such efforts are clarity, precision, fidelity to text, tradition, and case law, and the use of judgment 
in the face of new and unanticipated developments. If we may be indulged one small normative 
comment, not only does this accurately capture what the Court is doing, we think it plausible 
that, however dull this may appear to the legal theorist, the country may be better off as a result.
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